Interest and Bonus Payments in the Law of Mortgages by Sinclair, Alan M.
INTEREST AND BONUS PAYMENTS 
IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES *
Alan M. Sinclair*
Two recent cases, one in Nova Scotia1 and the other in 
A lberta / have dealt with the problem of bonuses attached to 
mortgages of real property. In each case, the mortgagee (or his 
assignee) was unsuccessful in his attempt to fasten a bonus to the 
mortgage. As the bonus was eliminated in both cases, it would 
appear efficacious at this juncture in the development of the law 
to spend a little time on what will almost certainly prove to be 
a most topical subject.
The background of rates of interest and bonus payments as 
they apply to mortgages of real property is somewhat tangled 
due in large measure to the conditions and philosophies extant 
at the time of the cases in point. The farthest back one needs 
go is to the period in English legal history of the usury laws and 
their subsequent repeal.3 There is little doubt that such a change 
as was effected by repeal was reflected in large measure in the 
enhanced power of the Chancery Court to deal with agreements 
between individuals which resulted in oppression or unfair advan­
tage. This increased jurisdiction in the Chancery Court gave rise 
to equitable decisions controlling to a limited extent the rates 
of interest and bonus payments.4 Certainly the leading case on 
the point, Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Co.,6 decided the route 
to be taken by future courts faced with inordinate rates of interest 
and bonuses. In Lord Parker’s words :
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1 Longley v. Barbrick (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 672.
2 Stephen Investments Ltd. v. LeBlanc (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 346.
3 By (1854), 17 and 18 Viet., c. 90.
4 As to excessive interest rates, see Croft v. Graham (1863), 2 DeG. & 
S. 155; 46 E.R. 334 and Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873), L.R.
8 Ch. App. 484 and as to bonus payments see Barrett v. Hartley 
(1866), L.R. 2 Eq. 789, in particular, at p. 795. Further reference 
might also be had to Smith, “Validity o f Bonuses in Mortgages” 
( 1927), 5 Can. Bar Rev. 161, at p. 163.
5 [1914] A.C. 25.
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In every case in which a stipulation by a mortgagee for a 
collateral advantage has, since the repeal of the usury laws, been 
held invalid, the stipulation has been open to objection either
(1 ) because it was unconscionable, or (2 ) because it was in the 
nature of a penal clause clogging the equity arising on failure to 
exercise a contractual right to redeem, or (3 ) because it was in 
the nature of a condition repugnant as well to the contractual as 
to the equitable right.0
It is not difficult to conclude that the advent of high interest 
rates and large bonuses which followed hard on the heels of the 
repeal of the usury laws was soon to meet the confining influence 
of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery and have 
thereafter a continued struggle for existence. The use of the words 
“oppressive” and “unconscionable” enables any court to encom­
pass whatever actions the court wishes to envelop. It puts such 
discretionary power in a court then as to effect the standard 
thought desirable at any given time in the lending field. These 
standards obviously change as social conditions generally change 
and as particular fact situations at any time demand. One example 
from this jurisdiction will illustrate.7
The mortgagor (in 1902) borrowed £3,500 from the mort­
gagee on security of a property valued at only £2,500 for the pur­
pose of operating a salt spring. The mortgagor was to repay 
£6,000 in cash and, as well, transfer to the mortgagee some £5,000 
in paid-up shares of a company to be formed to operate the salt 
works. On a claim by the mortgagor that this repayment provision 
amounted to a clog on redemption and that it should therefore 
be relieved against, the court refused to comply with the request 
and held that “The difference between the sum loaned and the 
sum secured . . . does seem large . . . but no such defence [as 
oppression or surprise] was set up here . . .”8 In thus ordering 
the bonus paid the court agreed that no inequity under these 
facts existed. This type of decision, allowing large bonuses and 
high rates of interest, may be seen in other jurisdictions as well.®
It is not difficult to see that a plateau was reached following 
repeal of the usury laws where there were no precise limits on the 
rate of interest or on the amount of the bonus. There was the
6 Ibid., at pp. 54-55.
7 Buchanan v. Harvie (1904), 3 N.B. Eq. 61.
8 Ibid., at p. 67.
9 “A contract for payment to the mortgagee of a bonus in addition to 
the sum advanced is valid if the bonus is reasonable and the contract 
was freely entered into by the mortgagor.” Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, 3rd ed., vol. 27, p. 238.
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ever present threat erf an equitable remedy in the mortgagor 
based on oppressive treatment but this was rarely used as witness 
the New Brunswick case outlined above.
The next progression in the story of the bonus and the 
interest rate moves to the passage in Parliament of the Interest 
Act.10 It would appear that this statute should have little if any 
bearing on matters of bonus or excessive rates of interest and 
thus little significance in this paper for the Act is definitely not 
a usury statute. It provides expressly that “any person may 
stipulate for, allow and exact . . . any rate of interest or discount 
that is agreed upon”.11 The real problem arises because of a 
further section in this statute on which a number of courts have 
dwelt in dealing with interest and bonus payments. It will be 
recalled that under the most familiar section of the Act, section 6, 
that if the mortgage is to be amortized by one of three methods, 
viz., blended payments of principal and interest, stipulated repay­
ments or on the sinking fund plan, then no interest at all can be 
recovered by the mortgagee unless the mortgage contains a state­
ment showing the principal amount and the rate of interest 
claimed.
A number of cases have arisen involving a promise by the 
mortgagor to repay not only the principal and interest but to pay 
a bonus as well and the courts have had to concern themselves 
with the effect of section 6 on such provisions. The burden of 
such cases is placed directly on the fact that the bonus sometimes 
makes it very difficult to determine exactly what the rate of 
interest is on the principal sum actually advanced.
In Singer v. Goldhar,12 the mortgagee advanced the sum of 
$3,500 and the mortgagor covenanted to repay a total sum of 
$4,700 in monthly instalments. No mention was made of interest. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Interest Act applied 
and that as section 6 was not complied with (as no rate of interest 
was stated) no interest whatsoever was recoverable. While the 
mortgagor was informed as to the amount of bonus (or interest) 
he was paying he was not informed as to the rate of interest. The 
important function of this case in the jurisprudence of this facet 
of the law of mortgages is that it is a case which involves a 
method of repayment consonant with the Interest Act and brings 
into play therefore the exacting rules of that statute. Just how 
important this delineation is can readily be seen from the two 
major cases in this area which follow.
10 R.S.C., 1952, c. 156.
11 Ibid., s. 2.
12 (1924), 55 O.L.R. 267.
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In London Loan and Savings Co. v. Meagher,'* the mortgagee 
advanced $30,000 to the mortgagor and received in return the 
latter’s cheque for $3,000. This was admittedly a bonus for the 
granting of the loan. The face of the mortgage deed disclosed that 
the rate of interest was IVi % and this to be applicable to the entire 
$30,000. The mortgagor argued that as all that had really been 
advanced was $27,000 and as the 7 Vi%  was stated to be on the 
$30,000, a true rate of interest was not being expressed as 
required by the Interest Act. The Supreme Court of Canada was 
able to evade the real issue which is present here however by 
deciding that the method of repayment in this mortgage was not 
one of those three outlined in section 6 and therefore no require­
ment of a stated, correct rate was present. Singer v. Goldhar was 
distinguished on this basis and accordingly no decision could 
at this stage be made on the still pervasive question of the validity 
of a mortgage which had a bonus and interest provision and did 
come within the Interest Act by reason of the mortgage repayment 
procedure.
The latest case in this trilogy, Asconi Building Corp. v. 
Vocisano,1* also before the Supreme Court of Canada, dealt with 
two mortgages with face values considerably in excess ($5,000) 
of the amounts actually advanced. The $2,500 not advanced on 
each mortgage was agreed to represent interest of $1,500 and a 
bonus of $1,000. The mortgagor again proposed to the court 
that he should pay no part of the $2,500 on either mortgage as 
section 6 was not complied with in that no interest rate had 
been established or stated in the deed. Again the court decided 
in favour of the mortgagee in holding that this was not a section 
6 case, not being an amortization plan identical with one of the 
three there outlined.
A consideration of these three cases may lead one to the 
conclusion that if the mortgagor promises to repay the principal 
sum together with interest at stated intervals (the most common - 
method of repayment today, blended payments) and also promises 
to pay a bonus, then the interest rate must be stated exactly so 
as to cover all the surplus over the principal. It may be submitted 
that while no interest or bonus could be recovered if no rate was 
stipulated (in the light of the wording of section 6 ), if a rate is 
expressly set forth but it covers only the actual interest and not 
the bonus then the bonus itself is not recoverable but the interest
13 [1930] 2 D.L.R. 849.
14 [1948] 1 D.L.R. 794.
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is. Section 7 of the Interest Act may lead one to this conclusion.19 
An Ontario case apparently buttresses this view.10 The correlative 
of this conclusion however is as important as the conclusion itself. 
It is this: if the method of amortization is not one of the three 
as in section 6, then no rate of interest at all need be stated and so 
far as the Interest Act is concerned any amount of bonus and any 
rate of interest can be charged, separately or in conjunction with 
each other.
With these two conclusions in mind an approach should then 
be made to Mr. Justice Coffin’s decision in the recent Nova Scotia 
case of Longley v. Barbrick.1T The facts of this case provide a 
somewhat sad tale. Beatrice Barbrick telephoned a realtor in 
Halifax, Town and Country, and requested a loan of $2,500. Mr. 
Hickey at Town and Country remarked that he thought that could 
be arranged and agreed to call her back. This he did, and said 
that the manager had consented to grant her a loan of $2,500 
at an interest rate of 8% for 96 months. She later signed a mort­
gage in a lawyer’s office, not having read it, for $5,000. She 
signed, as well, a collateral agreement in the same terms. The 
mortgage was then assigned to Mr. Longley for $3,170. It should 
be mentioned that this was a first mortgage on a valuable piece 
of property. Mr. Justice Coffin is presented squarely with the prob­
lem of determining the validity of a mortgage which has an interest 
rate of 8%  of $5,000, a bonus of 100% leaving a cash advance 
of $2,500. At last a case in which there is a bonus, a rate of 
interest stated and a method of repayment falling within and 
therefore calling into play the Interest Act.
The choice of the method of handling this problem is 
extremely interesting. Mr. Justice Coffin, in his usual painstaking 
way, first concluded that the provisions of the Interest Act applied 
to this mortgage because of the method of repayment and then 
went on to say that as there was here a collateral agreement for 
bonus this set off the bonus as something distinct from either 
principal or interest. On the basis of the reasoning of the courts 
in both Meagher and Asconi, the bonus was valid under the 
Interest Act. In other words, in Coffin, J .’s mind, so long as the 
bonus is set out separately, the interest rate applying to the princi­
15 “Whenever the rate of interest shown in such statement is less than 
the rate of interest that would be chargeable by virtue of any other 
provision, calculation or stipulation in the mortgage, no greater rate 
of interest shall be chargeable, payable or recoverable, on the principal 
money advanced, than the rate shown in such statement.”
16 Rogers v. Labour (1929), 36 O.W.N. 316. Noted in (1929), 7 Can. 
Bar Rev. 555.
17 (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 672.
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pal sum being stated correctly under the Act, all the interest is 
recoverable. It seems reasonable to accept this argument when 
one realizes that the spirit of the Interest Act is being complied 
with in that the borrower is being apprised exactly of what this 
money is costing him. He knows the rate, the principal to which 
this rate applies, and the full amount of the bonus.
It follows clearly therefore that one can do one of two 
things to extract a bonus successfully in the mortgage business. 
First, be sure the method of repayment is such that no application 
of the Interest Act is possible (as in Meagher and Asconi) or 
second, if the mortgage is to be repaid on say a blended basis, 
and thus the Interest Act provisions are to be superimposed on 
the transaction, segregate the bonus clearly so that it cannot be 
construed as interest18 and if all other aspects are above-board 
all will be well.
It is because all other aspects were not above-board in the 
Longley case that it must be pursued further. It is obvious from 
the beginning of Mr. Justice Coffin’s judgment that he was 
bothered a great deal with the size of the bonus.19 After consider­
ing the judgments in the New Patagonia decision and the writings 
of Dean Falconbridge on the issue, Mr. Justice Coffin was able 
to conclude that while “the agreement could be upheld”20 under 
the Interest Act, it must be struck under the equitable rules 
already laid down as “unfair and unconscionable” .21 The fact 
that the amount of the bonus was “entirely out of proportion” to 
the amount actually advanced provided the convincing manner 
of decision. This was not speculative property and no risk of 
security was involved. The mortgage was reduced to  $2,500 
bearing interest on that sum at 8 % .22 It bears repeating that the 
size of the bonus alone was the factor which convinced Mr. 
Justice Coffin.
18 In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd. (1963 ), 
42 D.L.R. (2d) 137, the Supreme Court of Canada reinforced the 
Meagher and Asconi decisions respecting bonus. It is stated, at p. 146: 
“It is now established that in considering s. 6 of the Interest Act, a 
bonus is not interest and the fact that interest may be payable on a 
total sum which includes a bonus does not involve an infringement 
of the Act.”
19 “It is not usual to have a bonus of such tremendous amount, particu­
larly in the case of a first mortgage.” Ibid., at p. 676.
20 Ibid., at p. 683.
21 Ibid.
22 The plea of non est factum  was also accepted by Mr. Justice Coffin 
as a reason for reaching such a decision.
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In the light of this last statement above, it is interesting to 
look at a case even more recent than this arising in Alberta. In 
Stephen Investments Ltd. v. LeBlanc,23 the Supreme Court of 
A lberta declared “In order that the defendant succeed in setting 
aside an agreement on the ground that it is unconscionable it is 
essential that he establish the existence of a relationship between 
himself and the plaintiff which places him in a servient position 
to the plaintiff” .24 It is clear that the Supreme Courts of Alberta 
and Nova Scotia are saying vastly different things about the 
problem of large bonuses in mortgages. It is obvious that under 
the Alberta test, the decision in Longley v. Barbrick would have 
been that there was no oppression as the parties dealt always at 
complete arms length. As it turned out in Alberta, the court had 
to dismiss the defence based on oppression as the defendant was 
“a bright and intelligent young man, who was not without experi­
ence in everyday transactions” .25 This latter case involved a 
bonus of 50% and while this is only one-half of that in the Nova 
Scotia case, it remains an extremely large price to pay for the use 
of money.
As the Stephen Investments case turned out, the mortgagor 
achieved relief through another means which thus provides a 
further point of departure for this paper. This turns on an appli­
cation of another federal statute, The Small Loans Act.28 It will be 
remembered that under this statute, a loan (including a mortgage 
on real property) made by a money-lender (which includes one 
who does money-lending as a business or holds himself out as 
so doing) which is of the amount of $1,500 or less must bear 
interest at a rate not to exceed that stipulated under the Act. In 
other words, as to loans of a maximum value of $1,500, this is 
a usury statute.
Under the facts of the Stephen Investments case the amount 
of the face value of the loan was $2,250 although only $1,500 
was actually advanced. It is, of course, important for future appli­
cations of the statute to realize that this court was able to come 
to the conclusion that the $1,500 figure mentioned in the statute 
is satisfied so long as the amount actually advanced is not in excess 
of this figure. The total indebtedness has no relation therefore 
to the question of applicability of the statute; only the amount 
of the actual loan after the interest and bonus are scraped away.27
23 (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 346.
24 Ibid., at p. 349.
25 Ibid.
26 R.S.C., 1952, c. 251; as amended by (1956), 4-5 Eliz. II, c. 46.
27 Not only will the court reform the deed but the power is given it to
find the lender guilty of an offence and levy a maximum fine of $1,000
or to a term of imprisonment of one year maximum, or both:
section 3 (1 ).
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While no New Brunswick court has as yet been faced with 
a modern set of facts on a bonus question (or for that matter an 
extremely high rate of interest question), it is abundantly clear 
that if the amount of the loan fits the requirements of The Small 
Loans Act then this Act will work its way into this side of the 
lending field in New Brunswick. So far as mortgages on real 
property are concerned this will be largely felt in the second 
mortgage business. One then who makes a practice of such loans 
is going to have to be careful to abide by this federal statute as 
regards both rates of interest and bonus.
In respect to loans in this province in excess of $1,500, and 
say then the majority of mortgage loans, or certainly the majority 
of first mortgage loans, no decision is as yet available on the treat­
ment to be accorded high rates of interest (which perhaps is not 
as important in the light of today’s availability of money) and 
bonus payments.
With respect to these matters, some prognosis can be effec­
tively made. It is clearly possible that two possible routes may be 
taken. The first is to channel all these questions directly into the 
courts and have them dealt with on a “dog-law” basis. That is, 
when the question of the legality of a bonus payment arises out 
of a concrete fact situation, let the court seized of the case then 
choose to adopt the reasoning of Mr. Justice Coffin and declare 
the high bonus figures inequitable in a generally non-speculative 
transaction; or, allow such court to partake of the decision from 
Alberta and declare such to be valid so long as no oppression can 
be proven arising from the relationship of the parties. This course 
does have the advantage of injecting an element of flexibility into 
the course of justice which is always to be desired but it has as 
a corollary the usual companion of flexibility, the loss of predicta­
bility. An ex post facto explanation can never be satisfactory of 
course to a client who has relied on the advice of his counsellor.
The second route that may be chosen is the legislative 
approach. A New Brunswick statute, similar to that now in force 
in Ontario,28 and approved as to constitutionality recently by the 
Supreme Court of Canada,”  is one statutory solution. While this 
no doubt has some efficacy in Ontario, it is apparent that the 
wording of the statute does not accomplish fully what some might
28 The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 410. 
Similar legislation exists in other provinces or is being actively 
considered by them. It seems that the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada on the Ontario statute has had a catalyzing effect.
29 In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd. (1963), 
42 D.L.R. (2d) 137.
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desire in that it is only a quasi-usury statute. That is, it gives 
wide discretionary powers to a court to re-open a mortgage trans­
action and study its terms from a base composed of equitable 
principles made up in themselves of the concepts of harshness 
and matters of an unconscionable nature. It would appear there­
fore that this is legislation largely declaratory of the common law 
principles outlined above. The sanction of the legislature is of 
course a force to be reckoned with.
In conclusion, one should state that the course of the law 
in this area obviously depends to a large degree on one’s point 
of view. The writer would prefer therefore to merely restate the 
alternatives: a bonus payment or a high rate of interest will 
provide a possible crutch for a mortgagor who deems himself 
badly used if he can convince the court today that the transaction 
is inequitable either because it is harsh and oppressive (and thus 
inequitable) due to the amount of money involved in the bonus 
or the high rate of interest (thus adopting the reasoning of Coffin, 
J., in Longley v. Barbrick) or because the borrower was oppressed 
due to the relative positions of the parties (under the Alberta 
thesis). This plea will be necessary of course only if the amount 
of the loan exceeds $1,500.
As regards the future, the writer further ventures the opinion 
that if legislation is thought necessary to bring complete protec­
tion for the mortgagor to fruition then two alternatives are as well 
present here: the first is to adopt a statute similar to the Ontario 
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act and the second is to 
adopt a statute which is somewhat more definitive in that it estab­
lishes rates of interest (or total charges) similar in kind to the 
Small Loans Act. It would appear that the latter course, so far 
as legislation is concerned, is preferable in that the former is 
merely repetitive of the possible picture at common law. The 
constitutionality of such precise measures remains in doubt how­
ever as the ruling of the Supreme Court does not appear so wide 
as to allow a definite procedure.
